A Critical Examination of Kreuch's Classification of Theories of Self-Consciousness: Toward a New Taxonomy
Document Type : Original Article
Author
Department of Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom, Shahed University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
Throughout the history of philosophy, different theories have been proposed to explain the nature of self-consciousness. More recently, developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science have given rise to new accounts of self-consciousness, resulting in increasingly diverse and complex theories. Given this diversity, the development of a comprehensive taxonomy can significantly facilitate a clearer understanding of the existing theories. Kreuch is among the few scholars who have attempted to provide such a systematic classification of theories of self-consciousness within the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In Kreuch's taxonomy, theories of self-consciousness are classified into four principal categories: (1) reflective egological theories, (2) pre-reflective egological theories, (3) reflective non-egological theories, and (4) pre-reflective non-egological theories. In the present article, employing the analytical method—particularly conceptual analysis and analysis of the philosophical bases—we pursue three objectives. First, we provide an accurate exposition of Kreuch's classification. Second, we critically examine its underlying assumptions and identify its principal shortcomings. Finally, we propose an alternative taxonomy of theories of self-consciousness. According to this proposed framework, existing theories are classified into four general categories: (1) static substantialist theories, (2) static non-substantialist theories, (3) dynamic substantialist theories, and (4) dynamic non-substantialist theories. We argue that this alternative taxonomy resolves a number of the conceptual and structural problems inherent in Kreuch's classification and therefore provides a more coherent and comprehensive framework for understanding contemporary theories of self-consciousness.
Keywords
Subjects
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