Critical Study of the Relationship between Kant's Philosophy of Mind and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind with a Focus on Functionalism

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
Mohamad Mehdi Moghadas 1
Ali Fath Taheri 2
1 Ph.D. Student of contemporary philosophy of Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran
2 Professor of philosophy, Department of philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran.
Abstract
 
 
Introduction: This article aims to review and critique Kant's philosophy of mind, its impact on contemporary philosophy of mind, also its impact and relation to functionalism. Kant's influence on philosophy is based on the answers and methods he uses to explain the mechanism of human knowledge. The Copernican revolution of Kant refers to the change in epistemological direction of the object to the subject, for the correct understanding of the object. This approach has had important effects on contemporary philosophy of mind. Now our goal is to explore some of these effects.
Methodology: Our study method in this article is evaluate these effects in the field of contemporary philosophy of mind and especially, contemporary functionalism.
Findings: Kant attempts to explain the mechanism of human cognition by considering the mind as a structured thing that has some cognitive faculties, including the faculties of sense, understanding, and reason. In brief, the effects of such a mechanism in the contemporary philosophy of mind can be expressed in the following cases: (1) The need for a necessary structure of thought and experience. (2) The relationship between certain forms of consciousness and self-consciousness; and (3) excluding the Cartesian self. (4)The separation between sense and understanding is considered as the rise of the subjective matter from a physical foundation, and it indicates the hard problem of consciousness, that is, experience or phenomenal consciousness.
Conclusion: It is not possible to see the influence of Kant's philosophy of mind on the contemporary philosophy of mind as answers or even solutions, but as a way of thinking about problems. Kant's solutions have two characteristics, disregarding them will lead to a misunderstanding of his philosophy. First, Kant has expressed his philosophy of mind in a transcendental form. Taking him out of his vital form certainly leaves some of the most significant aspects of his philosophy behind. Secondly, his approaches are presented in a historical context. For instance, we should consider Kant's statement on the structures of the mind to be a metaphysical mechanism, and his perspective on causation is basically meaningful in a historical context. Admittedly, many of the problems raised in contemporary philosophy were discussed in Kant's philosophy, but the progress and transformation that occurs in these concepts cannot be attributed to Kant. The functionalist interpretation of Kant is possible, but it is in conflict with the most crucial teachings of Kant, which are architecture and the transcendental method. Such a reading excludes many aspects of an individual's mental life, and is based on a purely formal similarity.
Keywords
Kant
Philosophy of mind
Functionalism
Apperception
Consciousness
Self-Consciousness
Cognition
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