A Defense of explanationist fit view about epistemic support

Document Type : Original Article

Abstract
Abstract: According to the most important explanationist view in epistemic support, the doxastic attitude to a proposition is epistemologically justified for one Provided that the doxastic attitude fits the evidence that one has. Different theories attempt to answer this question that a doxastic attitude under what conditions fit the evidence and reasons that one has. In this article, I discuss explanationist fit view about epistemic support According to this view, p fits S’s evidence, e, at t iff either p is part of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e or p is available to S as a logical consequence of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e. After explaining this view, while expressing and evaluating its most important problems, I show that this view can be defended in epistemic support.

Keywords: justification, epistemic support, McCain, best explanation, explanationist fit.
Keywords
justification
epistemic support
McCain
best explanation
explanationist fit

Subjects

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