Requirement of Property Dualism to Substance Dualism through the Difference between the Realm of Mind and Physics

Document Type : Original Article

Abstract
 
 
Abstract
Introduction: Property Dualism in substance is physicalist and dualist in its prperty; That is, at the same time that he considers man as a physical substance, but believes that the mentioned substance carries two types of physical and non-physical (mental) characteristics. It is the physical feature that physics has access to and theorizes about it, on the other hand, the mental feature is beyond the reach of physics. If we prove that every mental thing occurs in the existential realm of the mind and every physical thing occurs in the existential realm of physics, then the requirement of the dualism of the attribute is that the mental attribute is in one realm of existence and its physical substance is in another realm of existence. Comes true. The present article considers the unreasonableness of the mentioned requirement because the characteristic of a substance is one of the existential levels of that substance and is co-ordinate with its substance and must be co-planar with its substance; So if it was a mental characteristic; That is, we proved that it is realized in the field of mind; It indicates that a suitable substance (in addition to the physical essence of the body) is realized in the same existential plane; Therefore, the requirement for the truth of dualism is the characteristic of the realization of substanct dualism.
Methods: Our method in this article is analytical and argumentative.
Findings: The realm of mental affairs is separate from the realm of physical affairs; If we believe in the dualism of the mind and physics, we must accept that the mind is manifested in the field and world of the mind. As a result, Johari must also be a researcher in the mental field, which carries mental characteristics; And this means that we have reached from property dualism of substance dualism
Conclusion: From the perspective of the duality of the characteristic, mental characteristics are beyond the reach of physical science due to their personal nature. In this article, it is necessary to be beyond the reach of physical science, because if a mental property is beyond the reach of physical science, it is a non-physical thing by definition, and if it is a non-physical thing, it is out of the realm due to the objectivity of the physical realm and physical affairs. The physical is outside and it is realized in a non-physical plane. Since the quality or breadth cannot be realized without substance, the mental quality (realized in the non-physical realm) also requires a substance, and due to the fact that width is the dignity of substance and they are realized in the same order of existence with their essence, then physical substance cannot be the carrier of mental characteristics, therefore, mental characteristics must have a substance of the same plane; That is, a non-physical substance. In this way, the requirement of the duality of the characteristic is the duality of substance, that is, the promise of the existence of two types of physical and non-physical substance is proportional to the physical and non-physical characteristics.
 
 
 
Keywords
: Property Dualism
Substance Dualism
Mental Property
Physical Property
Property
Existential Field

Subjects

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