PhD in Comparative Philosophy, Qom University, Iran.
Abstract
The issue of free will is one of the most significant and challenging topics that has occupied the minds of philosophers in both the East and the West. Among these philosophers, a group of physicalists, with a reductionist approach, strives to answer these questions: How can a human being possess free will? And if a human possesses free will, how does he/she take responsibility for his/her actions? Considering causal reductionism, which is based on the assumption that the behavior of the parts of an entity determines the behavior of the whole, since the parts of an entity represent the underlying level of complexity and composition, how can reductionist physicalists provide a correct interpretation of free will? Some of these individuals, like Sam Harris, have attempted to answer these questions from a neuroscientific perspective. In contrast, Christian dualists offer different viewpoints on this matter. Based on the principle of simplicity, we conclude that reductionist viewpoints, in opposition to Christian dualist views, cannot provide completely correct and flaw-free explanations for issues such as free will. Consequently, the explanations of the aforementioned rivals in this debate are more acceptable.