inevitability of non-cognitive value-judgments in scientific reasoning: demarcation argument
Document Type : Original Article
Author
Department of philosophy, faculty of humanities and social sciences, Kharazmi university, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
One of the most important and frequent arguments in support of the inevitability of non-cognitive value judgments in scientific reasoning, can be called the demarcation argument. In the shortest possible form for the author, the classic form of demarcation argument can be formulated as follows: (1) Cognitive values inevitably play a role as a criterion in accepting scientific theories and claims. (2) non-cognitive values are intertwined in cognitive values. (3) If the role of cognitive values is inevitable in scientific reasoning, the role of non-cognitive values will also be inevitable. Therefore, (4) the role of non-cognitive values in scientific reasoning is inevitable. In the first part of the article, this argument is supported against some criticisms. In the second part, after formulating a critical response that is called as the irrelevance argument, which the author believes poses a more serious and profound challenge to the demarcation argument, a formulation of the inevitability thesis under the title "weak inevitability" against the "strong inevitability" thesis—the latter attributed in the paper to the classical form of the argument—has been proposed and defended.
Keywords
Subjects
- Anderson, E. )2004). Uses of Value Judgments in Science: A General Argument with Lessons from a Case Study of Feminist Research on Divorce. Hypatia, 19 (1), 1–24.
- Elliott, K. (2011). Direct and Indirect Roles for Values in Science. Philosophy of Science, 78, 303–324.
- Elliott, K. & Richards, T. (2017). Exploring Inductive Risk. OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS.
- Doppelt, G. (2014). Values in Science. in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, Edited by Martin Curd and Stathis Psillos, Routledge.
- Douglas, H. (2009). Science, Policy, and the Value-free Ideal. University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Kuhn, T. (1977). Objectivity, value judgment and theory choice. in The Essential Tension, University of Chicago Press.
- Kuhn, T. (1996). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3d edition, University of Chicago Press.
- Lacey, H. (2015) “Holding” and “endorsing” claims in the course of scientific activities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 53, 89–95.
- Lacey, H. (2017). Distinguishing Between Cognitive and Social Values. in Current Controversies in Values and Science, edited by Kevin C. Elliott and Daniel Steel, Routledge.
- Longino, H. (1996). Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy. in Feminism, Science and Philosophy of Science, edited by L. H. Nelson and J. Nelson, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Longino, Helen E. (2002). The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- McMullin, E. (1982). Values in science. in Proceedings of the 1982 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol.2, Reprinted in Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Klemke, Hollinger, Rudge and Kline, 3d edition, Prometheus Books, 1998.
- Rooney, P. (1992). On values in science: Is the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction useful?. in Proceedings of the 1992 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol.2.
- Rooney, P. (2017). The Borderlands Between Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Values. in Current Controversies in Values and Science, edited by Kevin C. Elliott and Daniel Steel, Routledge.
