deliberation of Michael Tye's problems with the conceivability of Chalmers' zombie idea
Document Type : Original Article
Authors
1
PhD of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute.
2
Full Professor of Philosophy Department, Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute.
Abstract
The challenge between physicalism and anti-physicalism has entered a new space with the idea of the philosophical zombie. One of the main proponents of the zombie idea is Chalmers. The method he chose to prove his claim is a thought experiment. The central point of Chalmers' thought experiment in Zombie and its world is the distinction between phenomenal qualities and functional qualities. What is missing in the zombie world are phenomenal qualities. While all kinds of functional qualities are found in such a world as well as in zombies. In opposition to Chalmers by presupposing his framework, Michael Ty organizes a new thought experiment to show that although at the beginning of the path, the idea of zombies seems conceivable, but due to the emergence of unfillable gaps, it reaches an internal contradiction that in The ultimate idea of zombies and the world makes it unimaginable. The purpose of this article is to examine Tai's thought experiment and its flaws in order to make a proper judgment of what is right.
Keywords
Subjects
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