A Neuro-Philosophical Analysis of Damasio’s Narrative Identity in Relation to Theories of Narrative Identity Abstract

Document Type : Original Article

Author
Zeynab Arab Mistani
PhD Graduate, Department of Philosophy, Sanandaj Branch, Islamic Azad University, Sanandaj, Iran.
10.22034/zehn.2026.2065960.2130
Abstract
Narrative identity, as a pivotal concept at the intersection of neuroscience and philosophy of mind, provides a framework for understanding the continuity of Narrative identity is a fundamental concept at the intersection of philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and neuroscience, the explanation of which requires simultaneous attention to biological mechanisms and the interpretive dimensions of human experience. The present study, focusing on a neurophilosophical analysis of narrative identity in Antonio Damasio’s theory, seeks to examine the formation of narrative identity in relation to the concept of the autobiographical self and to clarify its relation to several major philosophical theories of personal identity. In this regard, Damasio’s account of the roles of core consciousness, extended consciousness, and the neural mechanisms involved in the integration of memory and experience is comparatively examined alongside the views of Paul Ricoeur, Derek Parfit, John Locke, and Maurice Merleau Ponty concerning narrative, psychological continuity, memory, and embodiment. The study adopts an analytical–comparative and interdisciplinary approach that integrates conceptual analysis of philosophical texts with findings from neuroscience, thereby enabling an assessment of the explanatory capacities and limitations of neurobiological accounts of narrative identity. The findings indicate that although Damasio’s theory provides a robust neurobiological explanation of the formation of narrative identity and exhibits significant convergence with certain philosophical approaches, it encounters limitations in fully accounting for the subjective, embodied, social, and cultural dimensions of identity. Accordingly, narrative identity cannot be reduced solely to neural processes; rather, it should be understood as a multilayered phenomenon and an existential project
Keywords
Narrative identity
Antonio Damasio
prefrontal cortex
philosophy of mind
psychological continuity
episodic memory
embodiment
Subjects
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