Fodor's argument in favor of psychological individualism: Examining Robert Wilson's response
Document Type : Original Article
Abstract
In this article, I examine Fodor's argument in favor of psychological individualism and Wilson's response to it. According to Fodor's causal argument, every scientific theory individuates states according to their causal powers. Common sense intentional psychology individuates states according to their wide content. Differences in wide content are not sufficient for differences in causal powers. Therefore, Common sense intentional psychology should individuates the states according to the narrow content. Wilson believes that Fodor's argument through causal powers, by appealing to the wide concept of causal power in the introduction related to the uniqueness of scientific types and by appealing to the narrower concept of causal power in the introduction related to supervenience, causes the obscure of the concept of "causal powers". As a result, these two premises are incompatible. The defender of individualism appeals to the revised individualist taxonomy by deriving a individualist reading from the relational types of science. According to this taxonomy, relational properties are not taxonomic properties in themselves, and are only included in the taxonomy of science as an introduction to internal physical properties. To clarify the falsity of the above claim about relational taxonomies, Wilson resorted to the example of Fodor's relational concept of the planet. He concludes that the problem of "wide and narrow causal powers" cannot be solved by any reform. Finally, I defend Wilson's idea.
Keywords
Subjects
- Burge, Tyler (1979). Individualism and the Mental. in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV: Studies in Metaphysics, 4, 73-121.
- Egan, Frances (1991). Must Psychology Be Individualistic? The Philosophical Review, 100, 179-203.
- Fodor, Jerry (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: MA: MIT Press.
- Fodor, Jerry (1991). A Modal Argument for Narrow Content. Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5-26.
- Kallestrup J. (2011). Semantic Externalism (New Problems of Philosophy). London: Routledge.
- Kim, Jaegwon (1984). Concepts of Supervenience Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45, 153-176.
- Kim, Jaegwon (2010). Philosophy of Mind. Boulde, r CO: Westview.
- Owens, Joseph (1993). Content, Causation and Psychophysical Supervenience. Philosophy of Science, 60, 242-261.
- Putnam H. (1975). The Meaning of ‘Meaning’, in Keith G., editor. Language, Mind and Knowledge (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vl.VII), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Rudder Baker, Lynne (1994). Content and Context. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 17-32.
- Saidel, Eric (1994). Discussion: Content and Causal Powers. Philosophy of Science, 61, 658-665.
- Van Gulick, Robert (1989). Metaphysical Arguments for Internalism and Why They Don't Work. in S. Silvers (ed.), Representation, Boston: Kluwer, 151-159.
Wilson, Robert (1992). Individualism, Causal Powers, and Explanation. Philosophical Studies, 68,103-139.
