Evaluation of doxastic compatibilism in the relationship between will and beliefs

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
Fatemeh Arabgoorchooee 1
Zahra Khazaei 2
Mohsen Javadi 3
1 Department of Islamic Studies, Faculty of Law & Theology, Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman, Kerman, Iran
2 Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
3 Department of Philosophy of Ethics, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
10.22034/zehn.2025.2042109.2062
Abstract
Compatibilists argue that the lack of intentional control over beliefs does not preclude an epistemic agent from being obligated to accept a belief or being responsible for their beliefs. Ryan, through Compatibilist Control, and Heller, utilizing the concept of reflective will, attempt to conclude that we possess sufficient volitional control over our doxastic attitudes to bear duties and responsibilities towards them. This question of whether we have sufficient control over our beliefs to be held morally responsible for them has profound implications for our understanding of epistemic justification, moral responsibility, and the nature of free will. In this research, employing a critical analytical method, we aim to demonstrate that this approach, when considering criticisms such as the ambiguity of human epistemic nature, the ambiguity inherent in the two concepts of reflective will and adaptive control and the doubt surrounding their adequacy for possessing doxastic attitudes, the inattention to the role of the environment in shaping epistemic nature and creating beliefs, and the intricate nature of the free will issue, cannot establish compatibility between the two categories of volitional control and epistemic responsibility.
Keywords
Belief
Will
Doxastic Compatibilism
Compatibilist Doxastic Control
Reflective Will
Ryan
Heller

Subjects

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